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 Chapter 9 
 
The Role of Community Engagement and the Practical Role of Moderate 
and Non-violent Extremist Movements in Combating Jihadist Terrorism 
 
Basia Spalek and Salwa El-Awa 
 
Abstract:  
This synthesis chapter gathers research evidence around community engagement in relation to 
combating jihadist influenced terrorism, including the practical role of moderate and non-
violent extremist movements. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section sets 
out the key debates within the research literature on the challenges of engaging communities 
and moderate and non-violent extremist movements in the UK. This section emphasises the 
importance of engaging communities in combating jihadist terrorism and also highlights the 
key complexities and challenges involved. This section also highlights that whilst there is 
considerable debate and controversy about the involvement of non-violent extremist 
movements in counter-terrorism, there is nonetheless research evidence of the merits of 
including non-violent extremists in community-based approaches. Section two explores some 
of the key Islamist movements from an historical and ideological perspective and what the 
research tells us about these movements in relation to their involvement in violence and its 
prevention.  This section particularly focusses upon our understanding of Islamist movements 
in relation to their involvement in perpetuating and/or combating jihadist terrorism in the UK 
and internationally. Section three presents research evidence of the more contemporary 
practical involvement of non-violent “extremist” movements, both nationally and 
internationally, in combating terrorism.   
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Introduction 
Scholars in terrorism studies have, for many years, written about the importance of considering 
communities when understanding, responding to and preventing politically, religiously and 
other ideologically motivated violence. Terrorists are in competition with communities and 
socio-political-religious movements for proactive and passive support for their causes, 
membership and resources. In the aftermath of a series of jihadist terror attacks, alongside terror 
acts committed by far-right extremists, in the UK there has been an increased emphasis upon 
the role of communities in combatting terrorism. “Communities can defeat terrorism” has 
become a well-known mantra. With this in mind, the following chapter comprises of a short 
research synthesis of recent published work on the role of community engagement, and the 
practical role of moderate and non-violent extremist movements, in combating jihadist 
terrorism.   
 
The chapter is divided into three separate sections. The first section sets out the key debates 
within the research literature on the challenges of engaging communities and moderate and non-
violent extremist movements in the UK. Section two explores some of the key Islamist 
movements from an historical and ideological perspective and what the research tells us about 
these movements in relation to their involvement in violence and its prevention. This section 
particularly focusses upon our understanding of Islamist movements in relation to their 
involvement in perpetuating and/or combating jihadist terrorism nationally and internationally.  
Section three presents research evidence of the practical involvement of non-violent “extremist” 
movements, in combating jihadist terrorism.   
 
Section One: Engaging Communities and Moderate and Non-Violent Extremist 
Movements in the UK for Countering Jihadist-linked Terrorism 
The terror attacks of 9/11 are viewed as a significant turning point in counter-terrorism policies 
and practices1 in the UK alongside other international contexts, partly because governments 
have increasingly become concerned by the threat posed by citizens from within their own 
countries.2 This has helped to create a “hearts and minds” approach to counter-terrorism, 
whereby community engagement in preventing terrorism is seen as a beneficial and even 
essential aspect.3   
 
Community engagement is a broad notion that includes drawing upon the knowledge, skills and 
credibility of members of particular ethnic/cultural/religious/political communities alongside 
involving a wide range of professionals working within health/mental health, housing, 
educational and other sectors.4   
 
The research literature suggests that engaging Muslim communities for countering jihadist 
terrorism can have a number of important benefits.  Individuals within Muslim communities 
may have knowledge about colleagues, friends, family members, and others that is not available 
to policing and security and other statutory bodies.5  As established by a large body of research, 
                                                          
1 Counter-terrorism policies and practices are dominated by ‘hard’ approaches involving surveillance and 
disruption activities and building technical and structural resilience.  See for example J. Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk 
and the Global City, London, Routledge, 2009, pp.1-10 
2 A. Cherney and J. Hartley, ‘Community engagement to tackle terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, 
tensions and pitfalls’, Policing and Society, vol. 7, no. 27, 2017, pp.750.   
3 R. Briggs, C. Fieschi and H. Lownsbrough,  Bringing it Home: community-based approaches to counterterrorism  
London, Demos, 2006,  p. 12 
4 B. Spalek, Terror Crime: Prevention with Communities, London, Bloomsbury, 2013; B. Spalek, ‘Introducing 
Counter-terrorism Studies’ in: B. Spalek (ed.), Counter-Terrorism: Community Based Approaches to Preventing 
Terror Crime, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 10-15; A. Huq, ‘Community-Led Counter-Terrorism’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 40, no. 12, 2017, pp. 1043-1048; R. Lambert and T. Parsons, ‘Community-
Based Counter Terrorism Policing: recommendations for practitioners’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 40, 
no. 12, 2017, p. 1055.  
5 A. Huq, ‘Community-Led Counter-Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 40, no. 12, 2017, p. 1041.  
there is no one pathway to terrorism6 and as such drawing upon knowledge about communities 
can help police and security services and others to risk assess a particular person or network or 
group of individuals and to take appropriate action as required.7 Much research has been 
conducted looking at community engagement in relation to community policing within a 
counter-terrorism arena. Although this can be both controversial and debatable, some research 
literature suggests that community members can be the “eyes and ears” of police, passing on 
information that can help prevent or investigate a terror attack.8  However, the research 
literature suggests that community members will not pass on information to policing, security 
and other statutory agencies unless there is trust.9  
 
The research literature places a large emphasis upon community engagement as a critical way 
of building and maintaining trust.10 The literature suggests the following stressors to building 
and maintaining trust:  where community engagement is seen by community members as being 
there only for information sharing reasons rather than to empower and support communities; 
where there are no information sharing protocols;11 where any trust that is developed is placed 
                                                          
6 J. Githens-Mazer and R. Lambert, ‘Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a 
Failed Discourse’, International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 4, 2010, pp. 889-901. 
7 R. Briggs, ‘Community Engagement for Counter-Terrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom’, International 
Affairs, vol. 86, no. 4, 2010, pp. 972-974; A. H. Baker, ‘Engagement and partnership in community-based 
approaches to counter-terrorism’, in B. Spalek, (ed.), Counter-terrorism: community-based approaches to 
preventing terror crime, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 80; B. Spalek and D. Weeks, ‘The Role of 
Communities in Counter Terrorism: analysing policy and exploring psychotherapeutic approaches within 
community settings’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 40, no. 12, 2017,  pp. 992-994.   
8 M. Innes, ‘Policing uncertainty: countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing’, The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 605 no. 1, 2006, p. 230; J. Klausen, ‘British 
counter-terrorism after 7/7: adapting community policing to the fight against domestic terrorism’,  Journal of ethnic 
and migration studies, vol. 35, no. 3, 2009, pp. 410-412; D. Ramirez et al., ‘Community partnerships thwart 
terrorism’, in D. Silk, B. Spalek, and M. O’Rawe (ed.), Preventing ideological violence: communities, police and 
case studies of success, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 158-160; B. Spalek and D. Weeks, ‘The Role 
of Communities in Counter Terrorism’, pp. 994-995.   
9 B. Spalek, ‘Community Engagement for Preventing Violence: The Role of Connectors’, Conflict and Terrorism 
Studies, vol. 37, no.10, 2014, pp. 830-836.  
10 B. Spalek, ‘Community policing, trust and Muslim communities in relation to “new terrorism”’, Politics and 
policy, vol. 38, no. 4, 2010, p. 793.   
11 A. H. Baker, ‘Engagement and partnership in community-based approaches to counter-terrorism’, in B. Spalek, 
(ed.), Counter-terrorism: community-based approaches to preventing terror crime, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012, p. 80.  
under strain as a result of policies and practices that stigmatise and potentially harm community 
members; and where there is a high turnover of staff within policing units/divisions and of other 
professionals.12   
 
Research indicates that counter-terrorism policies and practices, including initiatives brought 
in under the label of “community engagement”, have stigmatised entire communities. The 
research literature suggests that in the aftermath of 9/11 it is Muslim communities in particular 
that have become “suspect communities”,13 involving the securitisation of their identities, 
“hard” policing and security practices, and community penetration by informants.14  This can 
detrimentally impact upon any community engagement that is subsequently instigated. The 
research literature indicates that Muslim community members voluntarily cooperate with police 
to combat terrorism when they see tangible benefits that outweigh any negative effects of 
engagement, and when they have a belief that police are a legitimate authority, where police 
legitimacy depends upon the perceived fair and accountable application of the rule of law.15 
 
Community members can help the authorities make a risk assessment of any individuals or 
groups that have been flagged up as being of concern; they can work with individuals deemed 
at risk, as mentors, to reduce the risk; and they also may have access to persons that police 
                                                          
12 B. Spalek, ‘Community policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in relation to “new terrorism”’, Politics and 
Policy, vol. 38, no. 4, 2010, pp. 799-804   
13 P. Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. London, 
Pluto Press, 1993, pp. 1-320; P. Hillyard, ‘The Role of Communities in Counter Terrorism The “War on Terror”: 
Lessons from Ireland’, Essays for Civil Liberties and Democracy in Europe, European Civil Liberties Network,  
12 January 2018, pp. 1-4; C. Pantazis and S. Pemberton, ‘From the “Old” to the “New Suspect” Community: 
Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’, British Journal of Criminology vol. 49, no. 
5, 2009, pp. 53-57.  
14 A. Kundnani, Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism, London, Institute of Race Relations, 2009, pp. 
13-15; T. Choudhury and H. Fenwick, The Impact of Counterterrorism Measures on Muslim Communities in 
Britain, London, Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011, pp. 30-65; F. Vermeulen, ‘Suspect 
Communities- targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: policies of engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin and 
London’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 26, 2014, p. 303. 
15 T. Tyler,  S. Shulhofer and A. Huq, ‘Legitimacy and deterrent effects in Counter Terrorism: a study of Muslim 
Americans’, Policing Law and Society Review, vol. 44, no. 2, 2010, pp. 365-402. 
would struggle to engage with – those sections within communities that are particularly 
distrustful or fearful of police services.16 This raises the issue of engaging non-violent extremist 
movements, which has raised considerable research and policy attention, in the UK and 
internationally. 
 
In the UK considerable research highlights that non-violent extremists can play an important 
preventative and divertive role in that they provide identity, belonging and political/religious 
frameworks of understanding and practices and in this way take potential recruits away from 
violent extremist groups.17 Indeed, there may be no direct link between extremism and violent 
extremism.18 On the other hand, some commentators raise concerns about the involvement of 
non-violent extremist groups in combating jihadist terrorism. They argue that non-violent 
extremist groups can provide the space within which extremist ideologies and practices can 
flourish, making it easier for people to transition to violent extremism.19 Section two is a 
synthesis of research findings on the question of which groups of Islamists could be good 
partners in countering violent extremism and their historical and ideological foundations that 
justify this argument.  
 
Section Two: Research findings on the history and ideology of violent and non-violent 
political Islamists.  
                                                          
16 A. H. Baker, Extremists in our Midst: confronting terror, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 38-62; 
R. Lambert, Countering Al-Qaeda in London: police and Muslims in partnerships, London, Hurst and Co, 2011; 
R. Lambert, ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’, 
Political Science and Politics, vol. 41. no. 1, 2008, pp. 31–35. 
17 A. H. Baker, Extremists in our Midst: confronting terror, pp. 38-62.    
Robert Lambert, Countering Al-Qaeda in London: police and Muslims in partnerships. London: Hurst and Co. 
2011; R. Lambert, ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda’, pp. 31-35. 
18 Rachel. Briggs, ‘Community Engagement for Counter-Terrorism’, pp.971-981. 
19 E. Husain, The Islamist, London, Penguin 2007; M. Phillips, Londonistan: how Britain is creating a terror state 
within, London, Gibson Square, 2006, p. 1; M. Gove, Celsius 7/7, London, Phenoix, 2006, pp. 5-8. 
Research suggests that political Islamic20 activists who seek change within their communities, 
countries or internationally, can be roughly divided into three broad categories.21 First, the 
jihadi approach which resorts to violent means to achieve its aims, and which, in turn, splits 
into various political and theological sects mainly divided around the question of who is the 
enemy (national or international).22 Those groups include small local militants whose acts of 
violence are directed towards their countries’ regimes, but also affecting civilians, groups such 
as the former Jihad organisation (Tanzim al-Jihad) of Egypt with its many offspring groups23 
and the newly emerging Harakat Hasm; and transnationally active groups such Al-Qaeda and 
the Islamic State; or those active both locally and internationally such as Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameron. 24 
 
There are two approaches that refuse to endorse violence on a theological basis and, thus, offer 
the alternative to jihadists’ violent extremism. These are namely the non-jihadi “radical” 
                                                          
20 This is to exclude spiritual and non-political groups that do not aspire to achieve “change” such as the purely 
spiritual sufi approach or the purely classical educational/scholarly approach of madrasas and darul ‘ulum, for 
example. 
21 This division is not meant as the ultimate and definitive division. Each of the three categories split internally 
into a large number of other groups sometimes varying in ideology and practice. Also, the social and political 
situations they react to are in a state of constant change and therefore new groups keep emerging and ideologies 
are consequently revised.  
22 F. A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: why jihad went global, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 119-
184. 
23 For more on the small local jihadi groups in Egypt: Abdul Mun‘im Munib, Kharitat al-Harakat al-Islamiyyah 
fi Misr (Map of the Islamic Movements in Egypt), Cairo: Al-Shabaka al-‘Arabiyyah Lima‘lümat Hqüq al-Insan, 
2009, pp. 10-15, available here: http://www.anhri.net/reports/islamic-map/islamic-map.pdf 
For more on international Jihadist networks:  
Dia’ Rashwan and Muhammad Fayiz Farahat (ed.), Dalil al-Harakat al-Islamiyyah fi l-‘Alam (A guide to Islamic 
Movements around the World), Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram Liddirasat Al-Istratigiyyah, 2006. 
M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 2004; M. Sageman, 
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 2008;  
M. Sageman, ‘Understanding Jihadi Networks’, Strategic Insights, vol. 5, no. 4, 2005. Accessed: 1.02.2018. 
https://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20140819_SagemanUnderstandingJihadiNetworks.pdf24 For more on Boko Haram, 
its activities and links with other international organisations: A. R. Mustapha (ed.), Sects & Social 
Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, Suffolk & New York, Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2014, 
pp 147-198; M. A. Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security, and the State in Nigeria, 
Los Angeles, Tsehai Publishers, 2015. 
24 For more on Boko Haram, its activities and links with other international organisations: A. R. Mustapha (ed.), 
Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, Suffolk & New York, Boydell & 
Brewer Ltd, 2014, pp 147-198; M. A. Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security, and 
the State in Nigeria, Los Angeles, Tsehai Publishers, 2015. 
approach of Wahhabi Salafism and the “moderate” or rather “centrist”25 reformist approach of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (henceforth MB) global movement.26 Both approaches are wide-
spread and largely represented in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries.27 
 
Looking at the ideologies and theological basis of the two movements shows that they can pose 
a threat to violent extremism because they both are founded on a theological basis that is 
contradictory to the ideas adopted by the global jihadi movement and their ideologues explicitly 
oppose its activities as well as principles and engage in direct theological and jurisprudential 
polemic with their jihadist counterparts.28  
 
The aims of political Islamist activism have often been to achieve individual, social and political 
reform through recourse to a pure form of religion.29 However, contemporary radical Salafism 
rooted in Wahhabism discourages political participation altogether because of the movement’s 
strong association with the Saudi State. There is much debate about Wahhabi Salafism and a 
                                                          
25 For the origin and implications of the term “centrist”, R. W. Baker, Islam without Fear, USA, Harvard University 
Press, 2003. 
26 By the MB’s global movement, I do not mean just the organisational members of the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
rather the many groups across the globe adopting the peaceful political approach of Hassan El-Banna, founder of 
the MB, such as the Jamaat Islami in India and Pakistan and groups tied with it in Bangladesh, Kashmir and 
elsewhere as well as other more recent ideologies developing within groups such as the EIG in Egypt. 
27 See: Dia’ Rashwan and Mu˛ammad Fayiz Farahat (ed.), 2006.  
Ahmad Salim Abu Fihr, Ikhtilaf al-Islamiyyin: halat Misr unamudhajan (Differences among Islamists: Egypt as 
a case study), Cairo: Markaz Nama’ lil-Buhüth wa Al-Dirasat, 2013.  
28 Muhammad Mustafa al-Muqri’, Hukm Qatl Al-Madanyyin fi Al-Shari‘a Al-Islamiyya: (The Ruling on Killing 
Civilians in Islamic Sharia), London: Al-Markaz al-Duwali li-Ddirasat wa al-I‘lam, (1418 h). 
Karam Zuhdi et al, Istratijiyyat Tafjirat Al-Qa‘ida: al-akhta’ wa al-akhtar (Al-Qaeda’s Attack Strategy: mistakes 
and dangers), Riyadh: Al-‘Ubaykan, 2005. 
Nagih Ibrahim, Al-Jihad: ghaya am wasila (Jihad: aim or means?), Cairo: Dar al-Haytham, 2016. 
Hisaham Al-Najjar & Nagih Ibrahim, Da‘ish (ISIS), Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014. 
‘Ismat Al-Sawi, Hiwar Hadi’ ma‘a Da‘ishi (A Calm Dialogue with a Member of ISIS)), Cairo: Mu’assasat Rawa’i‘ 
li-thaqafa, 2017.  
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Al-Islam wa Al-‘Unf (Islam and Violence), Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2005.   
29 Akram Hijazi, Dirasat fi Al-Salafiyya Al-Jihadiyya (Studies in Jihadi Salafism), Madarat lil-Abhath wa Al-
Nashr, Cairo: 2013, pp 33-36. 
T. Stanley, ‘Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism', Terrorism Monitor, vol. 3, 2005. 
relatively wide-spread perception that it is the same as Jihadi Salafism.30 However, a large body 
of research into the history and ideology of Wahhabism concludes that this is not necessarily 
the case.31 Mohamed ibn Abdul Wahab’s theology has been embraced by the Saudi state in the 
seventies and the doctrine that forbids opposition to the state and any form of political 
engagement, be it violent or peaceful, has since become a part and parcel of this ideology.32  
 
Non-violent radical Salafis around the world have worked both alone and with the state to 
reduce political activism of all kinds, particularly jihadist activism, based on a presumed 
resemblance of the current time for Muslims to the earlier years of Prophet Mohamed’s mission 
(the Meccan period), when jihad and political confrontation with opponents were no longer a 
requirement on Muslims because Islam and Muslims were not in a position to win such battles. 
This, along with the principle of tahrim alkhuruj ‘ala al-hakim (forbidding rebellion/opposition 
against rulers), led to the conclusion that contemporary Muslims should live at a stage of da‘wa 
                                                          
30 The Telegraph Reporters, ‘What is Wahhabism? The reactionary branch of Islam from Saudi Arabia 
said to be “the main source of global terrorism”’, The Telegraph, London, 19 May 2017, available here: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/what-is-wahhabism-the-reactionary-branch-of-islam-said-to-be-
the/; C. Moniquet, The involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the support and supply of arms to rebel 
groups around the world, European Union, Belgium, 2013.  
31 Akram Hijazi, 2013. Pp 33-36. 
Trevor Stanley 2005, URL:https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-origins-of-wahhabism-and-
salafism/  
Mohamed Bin Ali and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman, ‘Salafism Vs Whabism: Are they the 
same?’, Eurasia Review, 2016 Accessed: 29.01.2018. URL: https://www.sott.net/article/330853-Salafism-vs-
Wahhabism-Are-they-the-same  
32 For various fatwas and discussions of ‘democracy as a forbidden form of shirk’ (polytheism) by prominent 
Wahhabi Salafi Sheikhs: https://islamqa.info/ar/107166 Accessed: 01.02.2018. The same source also includes 
references to fatwas by various prominent scholars of the Saudi Permanent Committee: Abdul Aziz bin Baz, 
Abdullah bin Ghadhyan, Abdullah bin Qa‘ud and Abdurrazzaq ‘Afifi.   
For further Salafi discussions of the legitimacy of political participation: 
https://www.sahab.net/forums/index.php?app=forums&module=forums&controller=topic&id=126009 
(preaching and teaching religion) rather than jihad (offensive).33  Therefore, to the Wahhabis, 
the jihadi solution in Islam is by default contrary to a non-violent solution. 33F34  
 
However, with the growing interest in global jihad, and the empowerment of young people 
through modern means of communication as well as the recent shock to Arab states by the Arab 
Spring uprising, in which many young Salafists participated along with all sectors of Arab 
societies, the case against the legitimacy of engaging in politics weakened gradually. The 
Salafis’ participation in politics after the political scene had changed gave rise to criticism and 
cynicism about their former theological stance and hence undermined the credibility of their 
ideologues and preachers.35  
 
The controversial global social movement known as the MB has often raised debate as to its 
position regarding the issue of jihad. To summarise a very lengthy debate, the following points 
should be noted.36 The MB’s struggle against colonialism ended in the early1950s, but it did 
involve the use of armed struggle against occupying forces. That was followed later on by the 
                                                          
33 Ibn Baz, Majmu‘ al-Fatawa (Collection of Fatwas), vol 8, pp 204-202 http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-
21537#page-3769 
Ibn ‘Uthaymın, Majmu‘ al-Fatawa (Collection of Fatwas), vol 18, p. 388. http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-
12293#page-7099 Accessed: 03.02.2018. 
For a further detailed discussion: Sadiq ibn Muhammad Al-Baydani, ‘Hal al-Jihad fi hadha al-‘asr farida ‘ala kul 
Muslim?’ (Is Jihad Incumbent on every Muslim in this Era?) http://albidhani.com/home/ لھ-داھجلا-يف-اذھ-رصعلا-
ضرف-نیع-ىلع-لك-سم / Accessed: 02.02.2018 
34 They are different alternatives that could only exist in different conditions and therefore are mutually exclusive 
in any given situation.  
35G. Fahmi, ‘Mustaqbal al-Salafiyya al-Siyasiyya fi Misr wa Tunus’, Carnegie Middle East Centre, 2015. 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/11/16/ar-pub-61954. Accessed: 13.02.2015.  
Also see, for example: https://www.almesryoon.com/story/1044151/-اھحدم-ىلإ-ةیطارقمیدلا-میرحت-نم-ةیفلسلا-ةوعدلا
تاعجارت-مأ-تاعجارم Accessed: 01.02.2018.  
This gave greater credence to the MB’s approach, which later won wide popular support in elections that 
followed in several Arab countries.  
36 For more details on this issue: Foreign Affairs Committee, Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood 
Review, London: House of Commons, 2016. file:///Users/SE/Documents/Research/Co-Jit%20paper%20-
%20BS%20&%20SE%20Dec17-Jan%2018/CoJit%20-%20Lit/House%20of%20Commons%20-
%20'Political%20Islam'%20and%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20Review%20-
%20Foreign%20Affairs%20Committee.webarchive  
 Accessed: 20th December 2017. 
Hussam Tammam, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Sanawat ma Qabla al-Thawra (The Muslim Brotherhood: Pre-
revolution Years), Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2013 pp 137-161. 
group’s leadership publicly distancing it from extremist factions evolving under persecution in 
Nasser’s prisons in the 1960s (the Qutbies and al-Tanzim al-Khass). Since then, the reformative 
political approach has become the only official position of the MB outside occupied 
territories.37 The movement aspired to participation in democratic processes as a way of 
achieving wider popular acceptance following the repeated persecutions of the movement’s 
members in Egypt (in 1954, 1962, and recently in 2013). Thus, the global Muslim Brotherhood 
movement repeatedly calls upon its members around the world to be active within the legal and 
political systems of their countries and, also, to reject all means of violent activism.37F38 
 
An interesting example that highlights the lack of compatibility between violent and non-
violent political activism in contemporary Islamic ideologies is a local non-violent political 
group in Egypt, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) (EIG henceforth). The recent 
history of the EIG shows that the group was only able to participate in the political process, 
from an ideological point of view, after it had denounced violence in the name of jihad in 2001, 
which was the fruit of a prolonged process of theological revision followed by a large-scale in-
prison de-radicalisation program facilitated by the State.39 More co-operation between the 
Egyptian State and the EIG in in-prison de-radicalisation has been repeatedly reported, since 
2001 to the present day.40 
 
                                                          
37 Omar Al-Tilmisani, Du‘a la Quda (Preachers Not Judges), Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi‘ wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 
1977. Notably here, this is the MB’s current position as regards all forms of political violence, except for that 
which is directed against foreign, non-Muslim occupiers in occupied territories, where they continue to use warfare 
against the occupiers, e.g. Hamas in occupied Palestine. 
38 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh al-Jihad (The Jurisprudence of Jihad), Qatar: Markaz al-Qaradawi lil-Wasatiyya al-
Islamiyya wa al-Tajdid, 2008.  
Ahmad Fawzi Salim, Qabla ‘Hasm’: limadha taraddada al-Ikhwan?’, https://www.ida2at.com/before-hasam-why-
did-the-muslims-brotherhood-hesitate-to-declaere-their-opinion-on-violent-groups/ 
39 El-Awa Salwa, Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha fi Misr 1974-2004 (The Militant Islamic Group in Egypt 
1974-2004) Cairo: Maktabat al-Shuruq al-Duwaliyya, 2006. Pp. 146-186. 
Mu˛ammad Abu ‘Atiyya Al-Sandabisi, al-Inqilab al-Fikri lil-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (the Intellectual Coup of the 
Islamic Group), Cairo: Awraq Li-nnashr wa al-Tawzi‘, 2012. Pp 163-245. 
40 S. El-Awa, The Relation between the EIG and the Egyptian State Security, Unpublished study, Cairo, 2009. 
EIG’s self-imposed theological revisions denounced the group’s old belief that the State and 
the Regime are ‘disbelievers’ who should be fought against, and, instead, called for 
reconciliation and gradual reform through participation in the political process and ‘dafiwa’ 
(Islamic education and preaching).41 This current position is almost identical to that of the 
MB’s. Subsequently, the group’s ideologues also engaged in theological debates with their 
jihadist counterparts about the validity and permissibility of their violent struggle from an 
Islamic jurisprudential point of view, calling upon groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State to denounce violence against state and civilians alike.42 The ideologies of these 
movements have a wide influence on Islamist activists across the globe and have therefore been 
invested in to counter jihadi ideologies in various parts of the world.43  
 
Section Three: Research Evidence of the Practical Involvement of Members of Non-
violent Extremist Movements in Combating Jihadist-linked Terrorism.   
Two particular case studies of partnership approaches to counter-terrorism involving members 
of non-violent extremist movements and police officers have been researched in depth within 
the UK. Both of these will be the focus here.   
 
The first case study is that of an initiative that took place between members of a Salafi 
community based at a mosque in Brixton in London and police after 9/11. The initiative 
comprised of Salafi community members working in partnership with police officers in order 
to risk assess vulnerable individuals, to provide interventions to make vulnerable individuals 
less likely to use violence (whether politically/religiously motivated or gang-related violence), 
                                                          
41  For details of their revised theology: Karam Zuhdi et al, Tashih al-Mafahim (Reformation of Concepts) (series), 
Riyadh: al-‘Ubaykan, 2001. 
42 See footnote 28 above.  
43 For example, see the works of The Jamaat Islami in India and Pakistan, the Izalah movement in Nigeria. 
and to flag up those individuals who had moved from non-violent to violent extremism with the 
police so that these individuals could be disrupted and prevented from committing acts of 
terrorism.  It is important to highlight that this initiative between community members and the 
police involved a particular policing unit – the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). The MCU was a 
specialist community-based counter-terrorism policing unit whose particular remit was to build 
trusting relationships with wide-ranging Muslim communities across London, including 
moderate and non-violent extremist groups. The second case study of partnership between 
members of non-violent extremist movements and the police in London focusses on the 
involvement of community members linked to the Muslim Brotherhood at Finsbury Park 
mosque and the MCU. Again, the MCU set out to build trust with Muslim community members 
at Finsbury Park mosque, which had at one time been associated with the extremist cleric Abu 
Hamza. Both of these have been documented at length.44 The key findings from this body of 
research are as follows:  
 
• It is important to facilitate community participation as mutually beneficial, even if forms 
of participation are not routinely of direct police interest.   
• Trust building is key, particularly between police and members of communities who 
have been previously marginalised or alienated.  
• There can be conflicting values to negotiate between different partners: as the values 
and goals of police and community members are not always in concordance, it is vital 
that conflicts are addressed to the satisfaction of all partners, and that commonalities are 
used to consolidate partnerships.  
                                                          
44 A. H. Baker, Extremists in our Midst: confronting terror, pp. 38-62   
R. Lambert, Countering Al-Qaeda in London; R. Lambert, ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda’, 
pp. 31–35; B. Spalek, S. El-Awa and L. McDonald, Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes 
of Counter-Terrorism Summary Report, Birmingham, University of Birmingham, 2008, pp.11-18. 
 
 
• Information gathering, particularly trough good police-community relations, should be 
viewed as a secondary benefit of partnership work, which seeks primarily to empower 
communities to develop approaches to tackling violent extremist ideology and its 
propagators.  
• It is important to provide Reassurance Policing in the context of racist and Islamophobic 
attacks.   
• It is important to acknowledge grievances on both sides, for example the frustration with 
foreign policy for some community members, and the perception by some police 
officers that community members may apportion too much responsibility regarding 
political matters on police rather than politicians.45   
 
On an international level also, these findings have been reinforced. Trust-based cooperation 
between state actors such as special police units and Islamist group leaders in combatting 
violent ideologies have been successful in the de-radicalisation of thousands of imprisoned EIG 
members in Egypt46 and in de-radicalising emerging groups of radicals outside prisons in 
remote areas such as Sinai.47 The co-operation also involved empowering freed leaders of the 
group to identify individuals deemed at risk of adopting violent extremism, work with them on 
a theologically based de-radicalisation program and to flag up cases that they deemed to be in 
                                                          
45 B. Spalek, S. El-Awa and L. McDonald, ‘Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of 
Counter-Terrorism Summary Report’, pp. 11-14. 
46 See: El-Awa, Salwa, 2007, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya al-Musalla˛a fi Misr (1974-2004), Maktabat al-Shuruq al-
Duwaliyya, Cairo. 
47 For example: ‘Amr Al-Naqib, ‘Al-Sujun al-Misriyya Wazza‘at Kitab “Hiwar ma‘a Da‘ishi” ‘ala al-Jihadiyyin 
li Muwajahat al-Takfir’ (‘Egyptian Prisons Distribute “A Dialogue with a Member of ISIS” to Jihadis in an Attempt 
to Combat Takfir’), 24, 26.04.2017, http://24.ae/article/343379/ رداصم-ةینمأ-ـل24-نوجسلا-ةیرصملا-تعزو-باتك-
%22راوح-عم-%يشعاد22-ىلع-نییداھجلا-ةھجاومل-ریفكتلا  Accessed 03.02.2018. 
need of police intervention.48 This work continues to this day and time, although trust issues 
have arisen due to the change of administration that took place recently in Egypt.49  
 
The empowerment of the MB since the 1980s and the Wahhabi-type Salafi preachers in the late 
1990s led to the formation of a large social and political force of people seeking in-depth 
religious education and social and political change (particularly for the MB). The long and 
intensive efforts were successful in mobilising hundreds of thousands of Egyptians of various 
age groups and social and professional backgrounds towards meaningful activism and away 
from what was seen as destructive and religiously illegitimate jihadi ideologies.50 Such social 
empowerment is considered to be a key factor in the uprising that the Arab World witnessed in 
2011, choosing non-violent methods over militancy to change the ruling regime, particularly in 
Egypt and Tunisia. In more recent years, when Egypt’s military seized power by the removal 
of the elected MB president in 2013, the widely prosecuted members and supporters of the MB 
remained faithful to their peaceful (non-violent) ideology and, despite continued pressure from 
angry and disillusioned young Muslims opposed to the new regime, the group’s leadership 
continued to be publicly outspoken against the various calls to adopt violence to defeat the 
oppressive regimes both in Egypt and elsewhere.51 
 
To conclude, there is historical evidence that the two approaches to Islamic activism, the jihadi 
and the non-jihadi, negate each other and are non-complementary. The empowerment of 
communities called for by researchers yet again was most effective, as seen from the research 
                                                          
48 S. El-Awa, The Relation between the EIG and the Egyptian State Security. 
49 The previously exemplar successful relation between the EIG and the Egyptian state has been shaken after the 
recent change in Egyptian politics and is in a state of flux that is currently difficult for researchers to access. For 
more on the EIG after the 2011 uprising, see: Mu˛ammad Abu ‘Atiyyah al-Sandabisi, 2012, pp. 319-329. 
50 See, C. R. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt, 2002. 
51  R. Dandachli, ‘Fighting Ideology with Ideology: Islamism and the challenge of ISIS’. Brookings, 5 January, 
2017, available here: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/fighting-ideology-with-ideology-islamism-and-the-
challenge-of-isis/; see also: footnote no 35 above. 
discussed above, when it relied on non-violent Islamists being able and free to provide a viable 
and legitimate channel to which active young Muslims could resort instead of violence.52 
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